Pemex Negligence, Inc. and Its Zones of Death

Cautiously, one family member confirmed that although the spill had occurred in March, cleanup work did not begin until July. “They were around here last year too,” they added before ending the conversation and retreating inside their home—located only a few meters from the pipeline where the rupture took place.

Grumexsa workers themselves confirmed to Avispa Mídia the long delay between the emergency and the start of remediation.

The testimony from the family living near the well and that of Doña Gertrudis coincide with the accounts of other residents interviewed by Avispa Mídia, who requested anonymity. They report that in the past two years there have been up to seven spills in the ejido, caused by deteriorated pipelines that damaged plots where residents cultivate orange trees and other crops such as maize, beans, and squash—the main sources of income for those who still live in the region and have not migrated to the United States, a common trend in this community.

An ejido authority in Mequetla, also speaking anonymously, stated that many people have been affected by the spills that ruined orchards and cropland. At the time of our visit, some residents had been waiting more than nine months for compensation payments. The official confirmed that the problem is not confined to Mequetla; in the nearby town of Tincontlán there have also been pipeline ruptures.

Pemex itself confirmed, in response to a public-information request, that the March 19, 2025 spill resulted in the loss of 900 liters of water-oil mixture over an initial area of 120 square meters.

Regarding the measures taken, the state-owned company stated that while Operadora de Campos DWF suspended hydrocarbon pumping, Pemex maintenance staff carried out “excavation work, provisional repair of the pipeline [to allow the flow of hydrocarbons to resume], and cleaning of the oil-impregnated area.” However—as this report confirms—cleanup occurred four months later.

The company also corroborated residents’ complaints, acknowledging that in 2024 alone seven hydrocarbon leaks occurred between May and October, releasing a total of 2,450 liters of water-oil mixture and 400 liters of crude oil within the ejido. In each case, it said, the same provisional pipeline repairs and local cleanups were ordered. Yet Mequetla residents insist the cleanups were far from immediate and that contamination of water and soil persists.

This report also questioned ASEA (Agencia de Seguridad Industrial y de Protección al Medio Ambiente del Sector Hidrocarburos, Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection Agency for the Hydrocarbons Sector), responsible for regulating and supervising the activities of the oil industry. The agency confirmed that there were indeed registries of spills in the ejido and that administrative proceedings were underway, but argued that the details were confidential for five years. Its reasoning was that “this information, if disclosed to the petitioner, would obstruct verification and inspection activities.”

Across the town of Mequetla—both in rural areas and in its urban core—137 wells have been drilled for hydrocarbon extraction, though only 49 remain active, according to data from the Secretaría de Energía (Ministry of Energy, SENER) updated to 2025.

Oil extraction in this field is carried out under the Exploration and Extraction Contract CNH-M5-MIQUETLA/2018, an agreement between the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Operadora de Campos DWF, and the now-defunct Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (National Hydrocarbons Commission, CNH)—the autonomous body that oversaw Mexico’s oil contracts until March 2025, when its powers were transferred to a SENER sub-agency, the Comisión Nacional de Energía (National Energy Commission).

The ejido authority of Mequetla confirmed: “All the water is already contaminated—everything runs off into the drains.”

The short distance between the accident site and local streams exposes the vulnerability of the watershed—a risk already recognized in the project’s MIA-R, which noted that the Miquetla field “lies within areas containing important freshwater bodies—lakes, rivers, and streams of high ecological value facing deterioration risks—with impacts of permanent duration in the event of spills.”

Using field data and georeferenced points collected by the Avispa Mídia team in July 2025, contamination from the March spill was still detectable in soils and surface water up to 500 meters from the ruptured pipeline.

A Grumexsa worker confirmed that spills occur frequently and pointed to makeshift repairs on the pipeline at the very site where traces of the March 2025 spill remained visible.

The exposed pipeline—supposed to run underground—showed advanced corrosion, sections wrapped in nylon, and several metal clamps temporarily sealing leaks to restore hydrocarbon flow toward the city of Poza Rica, from which the crude is then pumped to its final destination: the refinery in Salamanca, Guanajuato, for conversion into gasoline and other fuels.

Spills in the Huasteca Veracruzana reflect the precarious state of Pemex’s national pipeline network—a result of policies that prioritize extraction over maintenance. For 2025, Pemex allocated 68.4 percent of its annual budget to extraction activities but only 14.3 percent to Logistics and Strategic Safeguard, the area responsible for pipeline maintenance.

The Auditoría Superior de la Federación (Federal Auditor’s Office, ASF) reported that in 2021 only 3,110 pipeline maintenance actions were carried out nationwide—less than half the required number.

Llano lamented that no up-to-date public information exists on pipeline locations, start-of-operation years, or volumes transported, preventing assessment of their actual condition. He also noted that extraction occurs mainly in aging fields such as Mequetla, where a greater proportion of impurities is extracted, accelerating pipeline corrosion and shortening service life.

According to data from the Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, SEMARNAT)—which oversaw spill reporting until that responsibility shifted to ASEA in 2015—Pemex and its subsidiaries registered roughly 10,700 hydrocarbon spills nationwide between 1999 and 2017.

Oil extraction in the Mequetla ejido also affects surrounding territories. The hydrocarbons extracted there are transported through the Miquetla-Jiliapa oil pipeline, which extends roughly 12 kilometers beyond the field, crossing other communities before reaching the deteriorated Jiliapa I separation battery in the Nahua community of Ignacio Zaragoza, municipality of Castillo de Teayo.

Residents of Ignacio Zaragoza and the neighboring Tutunaka community of Jiliapa I—both affected by spills—denounce Pemex’s negligent operation of its infrastructure, which has devastated land, water, biodiversity, and agriculture, their main livelihood.

According to residents, after each rupture Pemex workers simply patch the pipeline to restore flow while leaving the contamination unattended for months. In Jiliapa I, for example, by July 2025 traces of two spills from September and December 2024 were still visible in the stream crossing the community. Farmer Don Germán recalled with sadness that thirty years ago the stream teemed with shrimp, river crayfish, and turtles—species that have now disappeared due to high levels of contamination.

Following the March 2024 spill, residents of Ignacio Zaragoza filed a complaint with ASEA over Pemex’s failure to maintain pipelines. They submitted the complaint in May, opening case file ASEA/UAJ/DGCT/2C.16/025/2024, but received only an official letter promising that Pemex would visit the community to hold talks—something that, as of publication, had not happened.

Residents also report receiving threats meant to dissuade them from speaking publicly. Don Emiliano recalled that after reporting the March 2024 spill, Pemex repair crews arrived accompanied by lawyers who intimidated locals, suggesting they “avoid trouble” by not denouncing the contamination.

Such intimidation has created fear and uncertainty about the legal consequences of protesting. “We want to speak out, but we’re afraid,” residents said, referencing similar pressure in Mequetla, where anonymous testimonies claim that after community members blocked wells in October 2024, Pemex launched threats and reprisals against those involved in halting the company’s operations.

Despite protests and complaints, the spills have continued. In the second week of September 2025, residents of ejidos in Castillo de Teayo and Tihuatlán reported another leak contaminating a local stream.

In addition to the oil pipeline, two Pemex gas pipelines cross Ignacio Zaragoza, posing additional risk. Jiliapa I is also intersected by two private gas pipelines owned by Gasomex and TransCanada, further heightening danger in the event of leaks or other incidents. According to Pemex data obtained via transparency, five gas-pipeline leaks were recorded near these communities in April 2025 alone.

Even though the Miquetla-Jiliapa pipeline is essential for transporting crude from Mequetla, the environmental risks linked to it were not included in the project’s Environmental Impact Statement (Manifestación de Impacto Ambiental, MIA-R).

Part of the pipeline runs within the Miquetla field, but another segment extends toward Poza Rica, affecting other communities as we confirmed in July 2025. “Its entire route should have been evaluated as associated infrastructure for Miquetla extraction. By failing to do so, responsibility for cumulative impacts from spills is omitted,” argued attorney Francisco Xavier Martínez, an environmental-law specialist, calling this a recurring tactic in the industry to conceal risk.

According to Martínez, the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente (General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection) requires that environmental assessments consider every component of a project to accurately gauge true impact and risk. “When you don’t do that,” he said, “you’re hiding information so your project can get approved and you can claim it poses little risk.”

The CNH approved further changes to the Miquetla development plans—beyond reducing the number of pipelines—that benefited DWF. Such plans are mandatory, and non-compliance can lead to fines or contract termination under the Hydrocarbons Law.

In late 2018, the CNH issued a “provisional” authorization allowing DWF to use the Miquetla I and II Separation Batteries, built by Pemex in the 1960s and possessing limited storage capacity. The permit, intended to last only two years, was repeatedly extended—allowing DWF to operate for nearly seven years, until July 2025, without building or expanding its own facilities, thus cutting costs. New investment in this infrastructure is scheduled only from 2028 onward.

In 2021 and 2024, the defunct CNH approved further modifications that reduced total project investment over 30 years by nearly 22 percent (from US $1.87 billion to US $1.46 billion) and slashed production goals—from 102.7 to 54.5 million barrels of crude and from 212.7 to 128.4 billion cubic feet of gas.

During the process that granted DWF its 51 percent contractual stake in 2018, the CNH specified that four other Pemex-controlled fields adjacent to Miquetla—covering a combined 643.6 km²—could eventually be unified under DWF’s administration through a simple administrative procedure, without a new tender.

The strategy presented by Pemex on August 5, 2025, states that the Tampico-Misantla Basin, where the Miquetla field is located, is composed of “areas with geologically complex formations” without mentioning that these require fracking for their exploitation. Yet anti-fracking organizations warn that such formations do require it. According to Alejandra Jiménez of CORASON, Pemex’s Strategic Plan avoids naming fracking but effectively enables it—shifting environmental costs onto Indigenous territories and sacrificing communities in the name of rescuing the world’s most indebted oil company.

Hydrocarbon extraction in this enlarged area necessarily requires hydraulic fracturing. The use of fracking directly contradicts President Claudia Sheinbaum’s 2024 campaign pledge that “hydrocarbon extraction by fracking will not be permitted.”

“Mexico cannot limit its development options. If we need that gas, we’re going to extract it,” declared Víctor Rodríguez Padilla, Pemex’s director general, during the August 5 presentation of the decade-long strategy.

Environmental groups in the Alianza Mexicana contra el Fracking warn of massive water waste, citing current operations in Texas where a single well can consume between 60 and 151 million liters—so-called “monster fractures” capable of turning entire regions into sacrifice zones, a future that now threatens the Huasteca Veracruzana.

Requests for interviews with SENER, Diavaz, Weatherford, and Operadora de Campos DWF went unanswered as of press time.